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Abstract: 
Background: Double-digit health care inflation, coupled with widespread reports of poor care quality 
and deadly medical errors, has caused private sector employers to reevaluate their health benefits 
purchasing strategies, with a focus on supply chain management approaches. In other industries, this 
strategy has proven to be an effective method for simultaneously reducing costs and increasing quality. 
Purpose: This article describes four current applications of supply chain management network 
methodologies to health care systems and identifies potential ways to improve purchasers‘ return on 
investment. In particular, information exchanges, purchase decision, and payment agreement 
components of integrated supply chains are described. 
Approach: First, visual depictions of the health care supply chain are developed from a purchaser‘s 
perspective. Next, five nationwide programs designed to realign incentives and rewards across the 
health care supply chain are described. 
Findings: Although several nationwide efforts are gaining traction in the marketplace, at this time, no 
cost reduction and quality improvement program initiative appears to systematically align the entire 
health care supply chain from providers to purchasers, raising doubt about the ability of supply chain 
management network techniques to significantly impact the health care marketplace in the short run. 
Practice Implications: Current individual efforts to coordinate the health care supply chain do not act 
on all of the actors necessary to improve outcomes, promote safety, and control costs. Nevertheless, 
there are indications that several of the individual efforts are coming together. If national efforts 
touching on all critical elements can coordinate with purchasers, then the health care supply chain‘s 
performance may improve significantly. 
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Article: 
The U.S. health care system faces many cost containment and quality improvement challenges. The 
significant and growing percentage of the gross domestic product spent on health care, new concerns 
over clinical quality and patient safety, a growing number of uninsured and underinsured, and 
diminished consumer confidence in the health care system‘s ability to meet fundamental delivery 
needs are major concerns facing health care managers (KaiserCommission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured, 2002, 2003). By 2004, escalating costs and perceptions of poor quality were ―nearing crisis 
levels‖ from employers‘ perspectives, according to the Wall Street Journal (Fuhrmans, 2004) and 
leading academics (e.g., Porter & Teisberg, 2004). 
 
In Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century (Institute of Medicine, 
2001), the responsibility for implementing market solutions to address quality problems is put squarely 
on health care purchasers— both public and private. The committee recommended that ―Purchasers 
should identify ways to (1) recognize quality, (2) reward quality improvement, and (3) support quality 
improvement activities‖ (Institute of Medicine, 2001, p. 182). Recently, an influential Harvard 
economist, Michael Porter, has called on purchasers to ―lead the transformation‖ and reshape the 
health care system‘s competitive landscape to reward better quality and increased efficiency (Porter & 
Teisberg, 2004, p. 66). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), several national 
advocacy groups, and private sector purchasers have also heeded these calls and initiated new 
programs under the rubrics of pay for performance (P4P), value-based purchasing, and consumer-
driven health care. In the manufacturing sector, supply chain management (SCM) efforts involve 
precise supplier measurement and improved purchasing strategies (Chan & Qi, 2003; Hervani, Helms, 
& Sarkis, 2005). 
 
The purpose of this article is to discuss the utilization of SCM performance measurement and 
contracting principles in health care and to identify elements of the supply chain currently being 
targeted through purchasers‘ initiatives. In particular, the networked nature and nonfinancial outcomes 
being targeted in the SCM effort are discussed. In doing so, we first address a theoretical challenge by 
specifying a simple, but robust, model of a typical health care supply chain network. The model is then 
used to identify barriers to success that may be encountered by those attempting to increase supply 
chain efficiencies in health care supplier networks. The model is also used to assess five nationwide 
programs that have been implemented recently by large purchasers and to briefly describe the 
challenges they may encounter in the future under different market conditions. 
 
Background  
The United States spends a substantially larger portion of its gross domestic product on health care 
than most other industrialized nations without the universal coverage many of them provide. U.S. 
citizens with insurance also are finding their coverage eroding, as employers seek relief from rising 
health care costs by instituting higher co-insurance and copayment levels for their employees. At the 
same time, patient safety, care quality, and practice variance have emerged as major issues. A report 
from HealthGrades (2004) estimated that up to a 195,000 patients die in hospitals each year due to 
preventable medical errors. Efforts to reduce such health care errors have added an estimated $19 
billion to U.S. hospitalization costs annually (Zhan & Miller, 2003). 
 
Consumers are concerned about these quality, safety, and cost trends. In a nationwide poll, 86% of 
respondents expressed alarm about their rising health care costs. Two thirds worried about their ability 
to obtain the best medical treatment, and 60% were worried that a major illness may lead to 
bankruptcy (Cogan, Hubbard, & Kessler, 2004). In short, consumers, employers, public payers, 
researchers, and policymakers are concerned that the U.S. health care system is failing to deliver 
services effectively and/or efficiently. In response, some large employers are reassessing their 
approaches to purchasing health insurance and health care for their employees (Milstein & Adler, 
2003). They hope to transform health care purchasing and quality by selectively employing aspects of 
the SCM processes they use in other operational areas. 
 
Supply Chain Management  
Supply chain management was developed initially in the context of manufacturing. It involves a 
purchasing philosophy that emphasizes the development and implementation of contracting techniques 
that increase operational effectiveness and efficiency throughout the product delivery channels. In 
doing so, SCM attempts to change the relationships among suppliers and purchasers to fairly share the 
risks and rewards that arise from such business transactions—referred to as ―aligning incentives.‖ 
Furthermore, SCM attempts to realign incentives by focusing on the purchaser‘s desired product 
characteristics as the common evaluation metric. In the industrial sector, SCM addresses the process of 
how products are sourced, transformed, monitored, and delivered to improve quality and reduce costs. 
However, using SCM approaches in the health care sector has proven to be more complex. 
Supply chain management networks (SCMNs) in health care are built on the assumption that firms 
operate in a market through coordination of interdependencies (Morgan, 2004). Interfirm coordination 
typically does not occur through a central plan or a clearly defined organizational hierarchy or even 
through traditional market pricing mechanisms. Networked supply chains arise when neither the 
market nor traditional hierarchies lead to proper coordination, because both neglect the social and 
human interaction processes that typify a network of health care providers. It is only by coordinating 
the cross-cutting chains of social, political, and economic relationships that constitute health care 
networks that improved SCM can be achieved (McNiven, 2006). 
 
Health care delivery employs an SCMN where added value can be created by improved linking of 
consumers with appropriate suppliers (Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998). The activities used to manage the 
supply chain rely upon network enhancement, improved contract management, and more efficient 
service provision (Thompson, 1967). All of these activities are heavily reliant on information flows 
that are both timely and accurate. 
 
Health care delivery is complex, and the information systems needed to capture data and render them 
usable for SCM analysis are not yet widespread or fully integrated. Under such conditions, 
information asymmetries arise (e.g., incomplete communication flows among physicians, patients, 
insurers, and payers) in the network, where some members have a distinct advantage over others in 
negotiations. Physicians and other providers (e.g., hospitals) typically have greater access to relevant 
information than the consumer, the payer, or insurance intermediaries do. 
 
In health care settings, the physician plays a major role in ensuring both contract fulfillment and 
service delivery quality. In meeting these responsibilities, an agency conflict can arise between 
reducing costs, as a representative of the health plan (HP), and ensuring quality, as an agent for the 
patient. From a provider‘s perspective, delivering more services, often in the form of prescription 
drugs or state-of-the-art clinical tests, is one way to meet consumers‘ quality expectations. More 
testing also may serve to both increase provider income and possibly forestall the risk of medical 
malpractice costs. There is general agreement that the incentives in a fee-for-service environment are 
aligned to promote increased health services utilization (Ahwah & Karpiel, 1997; Burt, 1998; Calise, 
1994). Taken together, information asymmetries and poorly aligned incentives for providers can lead 
to suboptimal outcomes from a third-party purchaser‘s perspective. 
 
A Purchaser’s View of the Health System Supply Chain Network  
Models of SCMN for the health care sector are complex and do not readily lend themselves to graphic 
depictions. Therefore, we will begin by describing the macro-level system changes essential for 
SCMN to be effective in terms of the health systems‘ flows of health information, delivery of clinical 
services, and reimbursements. Despite the model‘s simplified depiction, it is an accurate reflection of a 
significant portion of the current health care market. In particular, Medicare‘s current fee-for-service 
component is captured by the model depicted in Figure 1. 
 
In the simplified model, reading from right to left in Figure 1, the following conditions apply and are 
indicated numerically: 
 
1) The employer or public payer assigns an intermediary to manage beneficiary HPs. Health plans, 
as defined herein, can range from a no-risk-sharing position (e.g., some TPAs) to full-risk-bearing 
insurers (e.g., risk bearing HMOs). 
 
2) The HP supplies a network of providers based on contracted discounts; the provider is the agent 
in the HP contractual relationship. 
 
3) The beneficiary enrolls in an HP and receives the HP benefit. 
 
4) The beneficiary engages a physician. 
5) At the same time that the physician serves as the HP‘s agent, he or she assumes an agency role on 
behalf of the beneficiary, providing care, referring the beneficiary to specialists, prescribing drugs, and 
admitting the beneficiary to hospitals. Assuming these roles and responsibilities, the physician 
provides inputs to other physicians, pharmacies, and hospitals. 
 
6) In turn, these organizations provide services and products to the beneficiary. 
 
7) The HP is billed by these entities and reimburses them for goods and services at agreed upon 
rates. 
 
8) The HP is reimbursed by the employer, including a fee for risk assumption, administrative 
services, or both, depending on the nature of the contract. 
 
9) For a given level of health care expenditures, employers/public payers receive their return on 
investment in the form of a healthy and productive workforce or beneficiary population, lower costs 
associated with employee turnover, or a satisfied constituency for government programs. 
 
Concurrent with each link in the supply chain are potential barriers or additional complexities to 
effective alignment of information exchange, service delivery, and payment flows across the network. 
In the model presented in Figure 1, the barriers and additional relationships necessary for effective and 
efficient supply chain operations are indicated alphabetically. These barriers and relationships are 
described in greater detail below and, later, in the context of discussing newly established SCM 
programs that are trying to overcome the following challenges: 
 
A.  Health care is not integral to most firms‘ core business lines (e.g., automobile manufacturers make 
cars rather than provide health care services). Therefore, most firms prefer to use agents to administer 
this function and often do not have, or are not willing to develop, the resources necessary to manage 
their health care supply chain internally (Brown et al., 1990). The addition of these intermediaries 
creates additional links in the supply chain network but may not simplify its management necessarily. 
 
B.  Because the intermediary is often paid on a transaction basis, particularly in TPA and PPO models, 
motivations to reduce service intensity must be built into the agreements and some form of general 
clause contracting is needed (Cox, Chicksand, Ireland, & Davies, 2005) to enforce those agreements 
adding to the complexity of the relationship. The effectiveness of the outsourcing strategies as a 
mechanism to control health care inflation does not appear to have significance. 
 
C.  The managed care backlash in the 1990s arose from consumers‘ preferences for broad provider 
net-works, allowing consumers to choose physicians who had no strong agency commitment to a 
particular HP. 
 
D.  Consumers delegate a significant amount of decision-making authority to their physicians who act 
as their agents. 
 
E.  Physician‘s agency dilemmas may lead to over-intensive diagnostic and treatment regimens. These 
supply chain misalignments arise because the physician is the agent for the beneficiary in matters of 
care (E1), for the HP (E2), and in matters of cost control (for other providers through referrals and 
prescriptions; E3) and as the principals in distributing of their own services (E4). The multiple 
agency and principal roles depicted by the ―Es‖ surrounding the physician and one internal to 
their decision-making process constitute the agency dilemma. 
 
G. The lack of clinical outcome and cost information return mechanisms from providers to other stake-
holders in the system perpetuates asymmetries of information, although this is gradually changing 
(e.g., note the absence of arrows from providers to payers). Health plan intermediaries often pay for 
transactions rather than outcomes, thereby creating provider incentives to engage in more, rather than 
fewer, procedures. 
 
H. Most employers and their intermediaries have experienced limited success in their population or 
prevention-based approaches to improving their beneficiaries‘ health. 
 
I. One mechanism that employers have used to control costs is to shift more care expenses to the 
employee in the form of increased co-insurance and copayments (note: only the copayments to 
physicians are depicted, but similar lines should extend to other goods and services, too). 
The barriers delineated thus far represent the major threats to effective implementation of SCM at the 
local, or micro, level, which is important because health care delivery typically occurs at the local 
level (i.e. patients receive care from local physicians and hospitals). This is in contrast to the supply 
chain illustrated in Figure 1, which can be implemented on a national or international scale, because it 
primarily involves the purchase of durable supplies rather than the local delivery of health services. 
The importance of the local market as the venue for many health purchasing activities should not be 
underestimated given the increasingly high level of hospital, HP, and physician practice consolidation 
over recent years (Miller, 2006). Nevertheless, many purchasers function across multiple markets 
(e.g., the Medicare program or the benefits programs of Fortune 500 employers), resulting in the 
following additional barrier: 
 
J. Employers rarely have a large enough presence in any given market to influence the providers‘ 
clinical decision-making behaviors through their purchasing decisions through SCM at the local level. 
Previous efforts made to ―straighten out‖ and align incentives along the health care supply chain 
include the managed care movement of the 1990s. However, these efforts met resistance from 
beneficiaries, providers, and, in the end, legislators. Contemporary efforts to realign the supply chain 
are designed with an eye toward rewarding desirable behaviors, rather than imposing inflexible rules, 
















The Health Care Supply Chain in the 21st Century  
Escalating costs and concerns about health care quality and safety have given rise to several private 
and public sector initiatives designed to reduce information asymmetries, improve service delivery 
quality and safety, and link the consumers to the decision-making and payment paths linked to each 
other. As discussed above, many of these initiatives fall under the broad category of value-based 
purchasing or P4P initiatives (Saver, 2004). Five of the most notable national efforts are discussed 
below, with an emphasis on the portion of the health care supply chain that these efforts are trying to 
influence (see Table 1 for an overview of the programs and Figure 2 for the supply chain link targeted 
by each initiative).\ 
 
Hedis/Cahps 
The Health Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) and Consumer Assessment of Health Plans 
Survey (CAHPS) are two of the oldest health care purchasing assessment efforts. The HEDIS is a set 
of approximately 60 standardized measures for evaluating clinical care effectiveness, as well as the 
access to care and utilization by a HP‘s population. The HEDIS measures are derived from claims or 
administrative data or patient chart reviews. The CAHPS is a consumer survey that assesses the degree 
to which consumers are satisfied with the service of their HP and the health care received from 
contracted doctors and hospitals. Both HEDIS and CAHPS are linked to the ―Managed Care‖ box 
directly to the left of the employer/payer in Figure 2. Thus, early measurement efforts were aimed 
directly at transparency in the portion of the supply chain immediately upstream from the payer, which 
is where purchasers believed that they had the most leverage and control, by virtue of having 
competing vendors available with which to contract. 
 
The data sets were developed to help purchasers better understand the value that they were receiving 
for their health care expenditures (arrows 1 and 8 in Figure 1), and many private and public sector 
purchasers still require HPs to collect and report HEDIS/CAHPS data as a condition of contracting. 
The results of both the clinical process measures in HEDIS and the consumer satisfaction measures in 
CAHPS depend on the collective action of health care providers further upstream from the HP in the 
health care supply chain. 
 
HEDIS/CAHPS only report results for HP members in aggregate; these data do not measure the 
performance of individual providers. Therefore, the utility of these data for comprehensive SCM 
efforts is limited. Some question whether HEDIS/CAHPS measure the degree to which care is 
provided in an appropriate and cost-effective manner (Mainous & Talbert, 1998). 
 
The primary manner in which HEDIS/CAHPS have been used in purchasing decisions is in payer 
contract negotiations (Arrow 1 in Figure 2) and the development of consumer report cards based on 
these measures (Arrow 2 in Figure 2). However, the literature suggests that few employers are aware 
of HEDIS/CAHPS (Gabel, Whitmore, Rice, & LoSasso, 2004) and consumer report cards have had a 
limited impact on enrollment decisions (Landro, 2004), calling into question the effectiveness of these 
initiatives. Other SCMN efforts have attempted more direct interventions to realign incentives in the 
sup-ply chain. 
 
National Business Coalition on Health’s Evalue8 Initiative 
The Evalue8 initiative is, in many ways, a hybrid of the HEDIS/CAHPS initiatives and is closer to 
being a ―classic‖ SCM program than those efforts. Evalue8 involves measurements at the HP level, 
using a standardized instrument gathered through a request for information (RFI; the request is 
depicted by Arrow 1 in Figure 2). Specifically, the Evalue8 RFI asks HPs to detail their health 
promotion and disease management activities for chronic care illnesses such as asthma, depression, 
diabetes, and coronary artery disease (Beich, Scanlon, Ulbrecht, Ford, & Ibrahim, 2006). 
In doing so, the Evalue8 RFI goes beyond the HEDIS process measures and seeks to understand the 
specific processes, interventions, and activities that plans engage in or that are implemented on behalf 
of HPs by contracted parties, such as disease management vendors. The addition of outsourced disease 
management vendors is depicted in Figure 2, and Arrow 3 depicts the performance of these vendors. 
(Note: Many HPs also have extensive in-house disease management programs, but these do not 
typically engage in the direct provision of care. They are involved directly in calling chronically ill 
patients to remind them of appointments, providing ―registries‘ to physicians, using claims data to 
identify possible negative drug interactions, etc.). One might argue that it is the clinical outcomes that 
ought to be measured, rather than organizational structures and programs. Nevertheless, many of the 
Evalue8 pur-chasers believe that they are paying for the processes that are not typically performed by 
the HPs and that it is imperative to monitor it to assess effectiveness and compliance with 
recommended care guidelines. This would be equivalent to an automobile manufacturer inspecting the 
process of tire production in addition to simply measuring the quality of the tires produced. 
 
Wagner et al., (2000) have argued that effective management of chronic illness requires productive 
interactions between patients and physicians and that disease management programs, including those 
sponsored by HPs, must ultimately influence the patient– physician interactions (hence the arrow 
pointing to that interaction in Figure 2). Outsourced disease management programs, as depicted in 
Figure 2, are one link removed from the disease management activity. The critical question is whether 
the HP effectively coordinates the chronic care management process, down-stream, so that productive 
interactions between the patient and provider occur (Beich et al., 2006). 
 
The literature suggests that for these interactions to be productive, many steps are necessary, including 
the identification of the subset of the population with the chronic illness and those in the population at 
risk for the illness. Next, these identified members of the population must be stratified according to the 
severity of their disease or the risk for the disease. Then, patients must be taught self-management 
techniques, and providers must deliver effective care that meets established clinical guidelines for the 
illness. All of these are viewed by many as necessary conditions for well-organized and effective 
disease management programs that have been outsourced, and the Evalue8 RFI seeks to measure the 
degree to which HPs are providing these processes. The goal of the Evalue8 process is to reward the 
plans with the best processes through better contracted rates or an increased volume of patients, thus 
providing an incentive for other plans to improve. 
 
Bridges to Excellence 
The Bridges to Excellence (BTE) initiative is an attempt to influence the manner in which doctors 
produce care in the outpatient (i.e., office based) setting and to pro-mote compliance with expert-
developed clinical guide-lines for the treatment of certain chronic illnesses, such as diabetes. Hence, 
BTE addresses Arrows 5 and 6 in Figure 1 and represents new internal processes in the practice setting 
(labeled ―4‖ in Figure 2). For example, BTE‘s ―Diabetes Link‖ program is designed to reward 
physicians for achieving compliance with recommended diabetes care standards in their patient 
populations (the two-headed Arrow 4 in Figure 2 depicts the exchange of information on compliance 
and payment in return). Such standards include process measures recommended by the American 
Diabetes Association related to the frequency of hemoglobin A1c screenings, annual eye and foot 
exams, and lipid and nephropathy screenings. In addition, measurements examine intermediate 








The BTE program can be viewed as a first-generation P4P program in that it has structured a payment 
system to provide physicians and physician practices with bonus payments for adhering to designated 
standards. Bridges to Excellence pays annual bonuses ranging from $50 to $80 per patient per year for 
physicians meeting the aggregate performance standards (Bridges to Excellence, 2006). Note that this 
program differs significantly from the HEDIS/ CAHPS initiative and the Leapfrog initiative in that the 
incentive is not based on potential market share or linked to the consumers‘ choice of a health care 
provider. Instead, the payment is based on physicians meeting standardized metrics for their existing 
patient base. Another important feature of the BTE program is that the reward is paid directly from 
employers to physicians, effectively bypassing the insurance plan (although BTE is now allowing HPs 
to license the program and administer multiple employer and public sector clients simultaneously). 
 
CMS’Premier Hospital Demonstration 
Beginning in 2003, the CMS began testing the effects of rewarding hospitals for providing better care. 
In conjunction with the Premier alliance of nonprofit hospitals, about 300 facilities across the country 
are submitting quality appraisals on five clinical areas for 3 years (Anonymous, 2005). The agency 
partnered with Premier because its prospective online performance tool offers more clinical measures 
than other databases currently available. Participation is voluntary, but hospitals with the best results 
receive an incentive from CMS (Becker, 2003). Early results indicate that the hospitals participating in 
the demonstration have experienced significant improvement in the quality of clinical process delivery 
and accelerated the adoption of evidence-based practices compared with a control group (Grossbart, 
2006). 
 
Similar to the BTE, the CMS/Premier demonstration primarily relies upon financial incentives to 
encourage improved quality. Hospitals performing in the top 10% in five clinical areas (coronary 
artery bypass graft, heart attack, heart failure, hip and knee replacement, and pneumonia) receive a 2% 
bonus payment through CMS. Hospitals in the second 10% are slated to receive a 1% bonus (Gebhart, 
2003). The double-headed Arrow 5 in Figure 2 depicts the exchange of information and the payment 
made in return for superior performance. 
 
Institutions that have not improved during the course of the 3-year demonstration could lose 1% of 
their Medicare funding, which is a nontrivial amount for most general acute care hospitals. Due to its 
large market share, CMS has the potential to drive change; however, the long-term effectiveness of 
incentives on generating a change of this magnitude remains to be seen. 
 
The Leapfrog Group 
The Leapfrog Group also advocates for fundamental change in hospitals. The efforts and activities of 
the Leapfrog Group are a response to the Institute of Medicine‘s 2001 report entitled To Err Is Human. 
With more than 150 private and public sector purchaser members, Leapfrog has called on hospitals to 
meet four patient safety ―leaps.‖ In an SCM sense, these leaps represent a realignment of the hospital‘s 
internal processes to more effectively integrate with upstream suppliers and the preferences of the 
downstream consumers or purchasers (this realignment is labeled ―6‖ in Figure 2). These leaps include 
implementing computer-assisted drug order entry systems, staffing of intensive care units (ICUs) with 
doctors trained in critical care medicine (i.e., intensivists and hospitalists), setting requirements for 
specific surgery and neonatal care volumes and care protocols, and adopting organizational safety 
practices designed to promote patient safety (NQF safe practices survey— www.leapfroggroup.org). 
 
In a supply chain framework, the Leapfrog Group‘s efforts attempt to go beyond the HP intermediary 
and focus on hospitals directly, including the internal decision making of hospitals‘ leadership. For 
example, by promoting the adoption of computer-assisted drug order entry systems, which has been 
estimated to cost between $200,000 and $2 million per year for U.S. hospitals (Birkmeyer, Lee, Bates, 
& Birkmeyer, 2002), the Leapfrog group is effectively trying to influence the capital budget 
expenditures and strategic plans of U.S. hospitals. However, this approach is common to SCM 
programs in other manufacturing settings. 
 
Another example of Leapfrog‘s attempt to influence the supply chain upstream is its intensivist leap. 
Most patients in ICUs are managed by physicians who lack specialist training in critical care medicine. 
Leapfrog is effectively demanding that hospitals change their clinical care and human resources 
policies so that physicians with expertise in critical care medicine are treating patients in ICUs. Hence, 
this leap is an attempt to influence not only hospitals but also those providing care to patients in 
hospitals (physicians). By virtue of this leap, the Leapfrog Group is attempting to change the current 
requirements for physicians treating patients in ICUs and for changing the rules and processes under 
which hospitals have historically operated. 
 
The other three leaps also are attempts to influence aspects of hospitals‘ supply chain for purposes of 
improving the safety of inpatient health care delivery and, ultimately, the reduction of medical errors. 
In fact, if one wanted to increase the complexity of the graphical illustration in Figures 2 and 3, one 
could enlarge the hospital box in each figure to diagram the entirety of the supply chain for hospital 
care, including each type of service the hospital provides. By doing this, one could trace out the details 
of how Leapfrog is attempting to influence the hospital supply chain, based on the belief that adoption 
of the recommended safety leaps will result in error reduction and improved safety, which the 
purchaser values as service attributes. 
 
Conclusions 
Both the health care industry and the field of SCM have changed significantly over the last 20 years. 
During this time, SCM principles have evolved to include both service sector and network 
configurations. Although it can be argued that the application of SCMNs to health care is more 
complex than to other industries and faces numerous barriers to success, employers continue to pursue 
attempts to influence the supply chain, including the five national efforts highlighted in this article.  
 
Each of these initiatives has tried to overcome one or more of the fundamental challenges presented by 
the U.S. health care system, including (a) transparency of outcomes, (b) the local nature of care 
delivery that gives many payers little leverage with providers, (c) complex networks of providers and 
intermediaries, (d) conflicting incentives created by multiple principal– agency relationships occurring 
among providers, and (e) historical payment systems that do not incentivize desirable behavior 
changes among the consumer. 
 
For example, all of the initiatives described above incorporate a social component related to health 
‗‗outcomes‖ measurement. However, many of these outcomes are merely care-process- or structural-
oriented measures, rather than patient outcomes related to health. Despite this limitation, the 
advancement in the field of measure development in health care has been impressive, although much 
more work needs to be done to reduce information asymmetries and to make the outcomes of care 
more transparent to patients and purchasers. Where measures have been developed, a minority of 
purchasers and insurers have attempted to adjust payments or change benefits to encourage the use of 
physicians who or facilities that provide the better outcomes. These efforts have proved challenging, 
however, as consumers and physicians have not been receptive to constraints on choices. Perhaps 
more importantly, the number of ‗‗higher valued‖ providers (i.e., lower cost and higher quality) may 
be limited in a given geographic area, making the operation of these programs challenging in practice. 
Furthermore, because no existing program addresses the SCMN in a holistic way, improvements in 
one segment of network might be offset in another area as suppliers rearrange their relationships to 
maintain profit margins. 
 
Another challenge for SCMN approaches in health care is the asymmetry of information between the 
supply and demand sides of the health care marketplace. The asymmetry arises because of the 
difficulty in gathering and processing health care data into actionable information. The difficulty in 
promoting electronic medical record adoption is indicative of this challenge (Ford, Menachemi, & 
Phillips, 2006). In many U.S. markets, there has been significant consolidation in recent years in the 
hospital (Cuellar & Gertler, 2005), physician, and insurance markets, resulting in less negotiating 
leverage for purchasers (Robinson, 2004). For example, a large Fortune 100 company purchasing 
health benefits in a small to mid-size city for thousands of workers and retirees typically represents a 
small fraction of the market share of a large hospital or physician group practice. Furthermore, because 
most corporations operate in numerous locales, they are effectively building a networked supply chain. 
In contrast, the traditional SCM models used in manufacturing sectors often span national or 
international markets where the purchaser can represent a significant share of suppliers‘ volume, and 
there are often multiple input suppliers to choose from, thus providing the purchaser with significant 
leverage in contract negotiations. Whether or not SCM efforts in health care can be effective given this 
fundamental difference in market characteristics remains to be seen. 
 
Practice Implications 
Current individual efforts to coordinate the health care supply chain networks do not address all of the 
actors necessary to improve outcomes, promote safety, and control costs holistically. However, 
alliances that cut across ideological and other traditional boundaries are forming. For example, a new 
alliance of a liberal advocacy group (The Center for American Progress), a conservative group (The 
AARP), an employer organization (The Business Roundtable, which sponsors The Leapfrog Group), a 
union (The Service Workers Union), and a major purchaser (Wal-Mart) has formed to address to 
address health care policy, insurance, cost, and quality issues (Wal-Mart Union Leaders Collaborate 
on Health Care, 2007). 
In addition, some of the SCM efforts identified in this analysis have benefited from each other. For 
example, the Evalue8 RFI now asks insurers to include the Leapfrog and HEDIS/CAHPS metrics in 
their responses. Individual employers also are beginning to apply both Leapfrog and BTE programs in 
their benefits management. However, benefits managers and other health care purchasers have yet to 
apply SCM techniques in an integrated way that recognizes the networked nature of the industry, 
addresses the information asymmetries through better contracting, and increases consumer 
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